Abstract This paper develops a model of a war against illegal drug producers. This war occurs on two fronts. First, to prevent the cultivation of crops the state engages the drug producers in conflict over the control of land. Second, to impede further the production and exportation of drugs the state attempts to eradicate crops and to interdict drug shipments. The model includes an interested outsider who uses both a stick and a carrot to strengthen the resolve of the state in its war against drug producers. We use numerical calibrations of the model to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of Plan Colombia.
Introduction
In many countries the state's control over much of the land within its recognized borders is tenuous and depends on the state's willingness to use armed force against challengers to its authority. This problem is especially acute in countries like Colombia in which the most profitable use of much arable land is the cultivation of crops that are the raw material for the production of illegal hard drugs-specifically, coca, which is the raw material for producing cocaine, and opium poppies, which are the raw material for producing heroin. The production of cocaine from coca base and the production of heroin from opium-poppy juice are relatively simple processes, requiring only the combining of the cultivated raw materials with a few chemicals in small scale local workshops.
Because almost all of the hard drugs produced in countries like Colombia are exported, the state typically faces international pressure-in the case of Colombia mainly from the United States-to make war against the organizations that organize and direct the production and exportation of hard drugs. These organizations are the residual claimants to the net revenues from this trade. We call these organizations for short the "drug producers".
This paper develops a model of a war against the drug producers. The war occurs on two fronts. First, to prevent the cultivation of coca and opium poppies the state engages the drug producers in conflict over the control of arable land. Second, to impede further the production and exportation of drugs the state attempts to eradicate crops of coca and opium poppies, mainly by aerial spraying of herbicides on arable land that the drug producers control, and to interdict shipments of drugs, mainly by raiding the workshops where drugs are produced and stored, by destroying landing strips from which drugs are exported, and by attacking airplanes that are transporting drugs. Importantly, the model allows for an interested outsider who uses both a stick and a carrot to strengthen the resolve of the state in its war against the drug producers. The model shows how the efforts and successes of the state on the two fronts in this war depend on this stick and carrot as well as on the technology of conflict over land and on the technologies of eradication and interdiction.
We also calibrate the model for the well documented case of Colombia. In this calibration we take the state to be the Colombian government, the drug producers to be the two outlaw groups, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), 1 and the interested outsider to be 1 According to many observers (see, for example, Rabassa and Chalk 2001; Echeverry 2004; Thoumi 2003; UNODC 2003) since the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartels in the 1990s, FARC and AUC, their historical origins as "leftist" guerrillas and "rightist" paramiltaries notwithstanding, have become the organizations that organize and direct most of the Colombian production and exportation of hard drugs, mainly cocaine and a relatively small amount of heroin. Bottía (2003) and Díaz and Sanchez (2004) use data from municipalities to confirm a high correlation between drug production and the control of arable land by the FARC and the AUC. Rangel Suárez (2000) tells us that at one time FARC only taxed and provided security for the various stages of drug production and exportation-the cultivation of coca, the manufacturing of cocaine from coca base, and the trafficking of cocaine-but that subsequently FARC began itself, as it does now, to organize and to direct the production and exportation of drugs. Rangel Suárez also discusses the other criminal activities, such as extortion and kidnaping, in which the Colombian outlaw groups engage.
